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ZEN AND THE ART OF TORT LITIGATION
Anne Bloom*
Legal analysis in tort litigation should encourage deeper engagement
with the plaintif's pain and suffering. Focusing more on
understanding the causes and experience of human suffering-the Zen
approach-will advance traditional tort goals of compensation and
deterrence, as well as provide the plaintiff with a more positive
litigation experience. This Article argues that currentpractices in tort
litigationplace too much emphasis on bodily harm and expert
testimony, and unnecessarily position the plaintiff as a victim.
Alternatively, a Zen approach recognizes that the body and mind are
linked, places greater weight on direct, experiential testimony,
and acknowledges the complexity andfluidity of the plaintif's identity.

Knock on the sky and listen to the sound
-Zen proverb'
I. INTRODUCTION

Law school trains lawyers to distance themselves from what is
happening to people in cases.2 This is as true in torts as in any other
area of the law. Contemporary tort theories emphasize corrective
justice and efficiency as the guiding principles for analysis.
* Professor of Law, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law.
1. Zen Proverbs, WIKIQUOTE.ORG, http://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Zen_proverbs (last visited
Aug. 3, 2010).
2. See, e.g., RICHARD D. KAHLENBERG, BROKEN CONTRACT: A MEMOIR OF HARVARD
LAW SCHOOL (Univ. of Mass. Press 1999) (1992); DUNCAN KENNEDY ET AL., LEGAL
EDUCATION AND THE REPRODUCTION OF HIERARCHY: A POLEMIC AGAINST THE SYSTEM

(2004); see also Owen M. Fiss, Reason in All Its Splendor, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 789, 801 (1990)
(noting that judges are expected to resolve cases in a detached way); William H. Simon, The
Ideology of Advocacy: Procedural Justice and ProfessionalEthics, 1978 WIS. L. REV. 29, 30
(1978) (noting that lawyers are expected to separate themselves from the personal and social
norms of others).
3. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (Wolters Kluwer 7th
ed. 2007) (1972) (articulating a law-and-economics or efficiency-based theory); John C. P.
Goldberg, Twentieth-Century Tort Theory, 91 GEO. L.J. 513, 570-76 (2003) (describing
corrective-justice approaches).
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Applying these principles, students learn to analyze the wrongfulness
of the defendant's conduct and the costs of preventing future
inefficient behavior. The plaintiffs pain and suffering take a back
seat to broader social objectives like compensation and deterrence.4
Some find it harder than others to keep this distance.' A few
years ago, some women in my torts class began to weep openly when
we discussed a case involving a woman named Linda Riss.6 Riss's
ex-boyfriend had hired someone to throw acid in her face.' The
attack left Riss blind and permanently disfigured.' Riss sued the New
York City Police Department for failing to protect her from the
attack despite her numerous pleas for protection.' Riss lost the case,
but what makes the story truly tragic is that she later married her
abuser. "o

This last fact is not officially part of the case, but I share it with
my students because it seems worth knowing. The additional
information generates different reactions in different listeners. Some
conclude that Riss's problem was not her abusive relationship or
even the courts, but a preexisting emotional condition: "Clearly,
there is something wrong with her," more than one student has
commented in my classroom. Others cry because they have
themselves been abused and identify closely with Riss.
There are two important points that the students' reactions
illustrate. The first has to do with how we bring our own experiences
into play when analyzing tort cases." As it turns out, it is very
difficult to distance ourselves from the pain and suffering in tort
4. See POSNER, supra note 3, at 196-200; Goldberg, supra note 3, at 571-73.
5. See Leslie Bender, Hidden Messages in the RequiredFirst-Year Law School Curriculum,
40 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 387 (1992).
6. Riss v. City of New York, 240 N.E.2d 860 (N.Y. 1968).
7. Id at 862.
8. Id
9. Id.
10. CRAZY LOVE (Magnolia Home Entertainment 2007). Riss explained her decision in

terms of limited options: "I am now damaged merchandise." Id.
11. See Angela P. Harris & Marjorie M. Schultz, "A(nother) Critique of Pure Reason":
Toward Civil Virtue in Legal Education,45 STAN. L. REV. 1773, 1774 (1993) ("[Elmotions can
never successfully be eliminated from any truly important intellectual undertaking, in the law or
elsewhere."). See generally PATRICIA WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS: DIARY

OF A LAW PROFESSOR 3 (1992) ("[Slubject position is everything in [the] analysis of the
law...."); J.M. Balkin, Understanding Legal Understanding: The Legal Subject and the
Problem of Legal Coherence, 103 YALE L.J. 105, 110-13 (1993) (discussing the role of
subjectivity in legal analysis).
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litigation, especially when we have some sense, from our own
personal experience, of what it must have been like for the parties. 12
The second has to do with how our reaction to the case changes
when we learn what happened to the parties after the litigation
concluded.
When the court ruled that Riss could not recover from the police
for failing to protect her from her ex-boyfriend, it had no way of
knowing that she would eventually marry her attacker. Moreover, it
is far from certain that a different legal outcome would have had any
impact on Riss's future. Yet when my students learn what did happen
to Riss, they think about the case differently.
For some, the fact that Riss later married her abuser provides
further support for the court's ruling against her. From this
perspective, even a favorable ruling probably would have done little
to help Riss because she is seen as fundamentally a "victim" and
perhaps as someone destined to a life of abuse. " For others,
especially those who have some personal experience with abuse, the
ruling becomes another instance of victimization with predictable
effects; 14 if the court had decided differently, Riss might not have
married her abuser.
On one level, these reactions differ greatly. One group of
students feels more sympathy for Riss after learning about her postlitigation life; the other group does not. On an analytical level,
however, these reactions are more similar than not. For most
students, learning more about the larger context of the case causes
them to focus more on what has happened (and is continuing to
happen) to Riss. Whether they think Riss is a "permanent victim" or
was unfairly victimized, students are no longer focused on the
12. See Balkin, supra note 11, at 140.
13. See Alan D. Freeman, Antidiscrimination Law: A CriticalReview, in THE POLITICS OF
LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 96, 97-99 (David Kairys ed., 1982) (giving an overview of the

"victim" versus "perpetrator" perspectives).
14. Some might view this as a "perpetrator" perspective. See id. at 98. Freeman notes that in
the civil rights context, the corrective justice model conditions recovery on the wrongful actions
of the "perpetrator" while largely ignoring the broader socio-economic conditions that help
constitute the "victim." Id. at 98-99. Something similar may be taking place in the tort context.
Students who were less inclined to permit Riss to recover from the City of New York viewed her
injuries as more closely associated with her status as a "victim" in society than the failure of the
police to protect her. See also MARTHA CHAMALLAS & JENNIFER B. WRIGGINS, THE MEASURE
OF INJURY: RACE, GENDER, AND TORT LAW 125 (2010) (presenting evidence that we are less

likely to sympathize with people whom we expect to suffer because of their status in life).
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wrongfulness of the defendant's conduct or the most efficient way to
deter wrongful conduct in the future; they are thinking about the pain
and suffering of the plaintiff.
This Article argues for changes in tort law aimed at encouraging
a similar change in perspective in a court's analysis of tort claims. "
It does so by drawing attention to how experience shapes our
perception of tort claims and to how these perceptions can change
over time. Like the students reading Riss v. City of New York,'"

lawyers, experts, and other legal actors analyze tort claims through
the lenses of their own experiences and in the limited context of a
particular space and time. This Article suggests some ways that we
can broaden the contexts and become more aware of our own
reactions to the plaintiffs pain and suffering in the legal analysis of
tort claims. " More broadly, this Article argues that we should make
more space in tort litigation for deeper engagement with the
plaintiff s pain and suffering.
The emphasis on compensation and deterrence is so deeply
ingrained in tort litigation that it is almost impossible to imagine an
approach to tort litigation that focuses on understanding the
plaintiff's suffering. 1" Yet there are many reasons why adopting such
an approach would be worthwhile. For one thing, many successful
trial lawyers claim that a suffering-oriented approach is better for
purposes of successfully resolving a case. 19 In other words, from the
15. See FREEMAN, supra note 13, at 98-99. Some may view this as an argument to place
more emphasis on the perspective of the victim. However, as I explain below, one of the aims of
the approach proposed here is to move away from rigid characterizations (and construction) of the
plaintiff as a "victim."
16. 240 N.E.2d 860 (N.Y. 1968).
17. See Harris & Schultz, supra note 11, at 1774 ("[W]hen emotions are acknowledged and
rigorously examined, they can serve as a guide to deepening intellectual inquiry . . . .").
18. But see CHAMALLAS & WRIGGINS, supra note 14, at 22 (advocating an approach that
incorporates the victim's perspective into a legal analysis of tort claims utilizing a feminist and
critical legal approach).
19. See, e.g., GERRY SPENCE, GIVE ME LIBERTY!: FREEING OURSELVES INTHE TWENTYFIRST CENTURY 302-03 (1998) (criticizing formal legal education for ignoring the experience of
law in our lives); Dana K. Cole, Psychodramaand the Training of Trial Lawyers: Finding the
Story, 21 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 1, 22-23 (2001) (describing Spence's psychodrama "technique,"
which involves intense client identification); see also Sande L. Buhai, Emotional Conflicts:
Impaired Dispassionate Representation of Family Members, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1159,
1161 (2008) ("Contrary to the vision of the hired-gun, the everyday practice of law is consumed
with the humane arts of counseling, negotiation, mediation, and empathy." (footnote omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Lynne N. Henderson, Legality and Empathy, 85 MICH. L.
REV. 1574, 1596-1609 (1987). See generally William J. Brennan, Jr., Reason, Passion,and "The
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perspective of successful practitioners, the adoption of processes
aimed at understanding the plaintiffs suffering produces better
results.20
Focusing more on the plaintiffs suffering in tort litigation may
also yield institutional benefits. Many plaintiffs value being heard as
much as, or more than, obtaining compensation for their injuries or
deterring future conduct. 2' Adopting practices that promote
understanding the plaintiffs suffering will increase the likelihood
that plaintiffs have a positive experience in the tort system. 22 Such an
emphasis is also more likely to meet with approval from the general
public, which has grown cynical about the tort system and its
emphasis on compensation in particular. 23
Reorienting the analysis of tort claims toward an understanding
of the plaintiffs suffering would also allow tort litigation to play a
more meaningful role in public discourse about injury and its
relationship to suffering more broadly.24 Plaintiffs have much to
offer in advancing this dialogue, but so do others with similar life
experiences. Litigation processes that help the public engage more
deeply with these experiences may help society improve its
understanding of the underlying claims and its responses to them. 25
I refer to the approach I propose here as a "Zen" approach
because, as in Zen Buddhist practice, the emphasis is on better
understanding the cause and experience of human suffering. 26 But
the approach is also Zen-like in two other important respects. First, it
Progress of Law," 10 CARDOZO L. REv. 3 (1988) (arguing that the complex interplay of reason
and passion is central to the vitality of the judicial process).

20. Buhai, supra note 19, at 1161.
21. See generally Tom R. Tyler, What is ProceduralJustice?: CriteriaUsed by Citizens to
Assess the Fairness of Legal Procedures, 22 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 103 (1988) (discussing citizen
satisfaction with procedural justice).
22. See id.
23. PHILIP K. HOWARD, LIFE WITHOUT LAWYERS 74 (2009).

24. For an overview of the psychological literature on suffering and grief, see generally
DANIEL GILBERT, STUMBLING ON HAPPINESS, 165-88 (2006). See also SCOTT VEITCH, LAW

(2007) (arguing, among
other things, that legal institutions help to organize irresponsibility by legitimizing human
suffering); Stan Van Hooft, The Meanings of Suffering, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Sept.-Oct.
1998, at 13 (calling for more scholarship on the experience of suffering).

AND IRRESPONSIBILITY: ON THE LEGITIMATION OF HUMAN SUFFERING

25. Brennan, supra note 19, at 5; Henderson, supra note 19, at 1576.
26. See, e.g., DAISETZ TEITARO SUZUKI, AN INTRODUCTION TO ZEN BUDDHISM (1964). The
title of this Article is a play on Robert M. Pirsig's bestselling book ZEN AND THE ART OF
MOTORCYCLE MAINTENANCE: AN INQUIRY INTO VALUES (1974).
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adopts a key Zen insight-the importance of direct experience-as
its guiding principle. 27 Second, as in Zen practice, the approach
offered here encourages skepticism about our capacity to understand
our experiences in any static way.2 8
Zen practices encourage recognition of suffering through
mindful observation and direct experience but also emphasize
acceptance of the impermanent nature of suffering. 29 This Article
argues that tort litigation would benefit by adopting this approach as
its own. 30 It also argues that if we take these ideas seriously, then
certain contemporary tort-litigation practices-like the emphasis on
bodily harm' and the heavy reliance on experts 3 2-seem misguided.
Instead of enhancing our understanding, these practices prevent us
from understanding important aspects of the case, including the
nature of the plaintiffs suffering and the uncertainties that surround
it.

The remainder of this Article proceeds in two parts. Part II uses
Zen principles as a starting point for critiquing current practices in
tort litigation. Part III offers a Zen-influenced alternative. It argues
for more direct engagement with the plaintiffs suffering in tort
litigation and greater acceptance of the uncertainties surrounding the
plaintiff s injuries.
The Article concludes with a meditation on the Zen proverb
"Knock on the sky and listen to the sound" and its implications for
tort litigation. It emphasizes the role that tort litigation plays in
bringing hope to those who are suffering and suggests that the
highest purpose of tort litigation is to make space for their suffering
to be heard. "

27. ALAN W. WATTS, THE WAY OF ZEN 52 (1974).

28. Id. at 43.
29. Id at 46-47; see also James L. McHugh, Zen and the Art ofLawyering, 39 VILL. L. REV.

1295, 1296 (1994) (quoting a Zen master telling students, "Pay attention! Pay attention! Pay
attention!"); id. at 1301 (discussing "mindfulness").
30. See McHugh, supra note 29.
31. See infra Part IIA; see also CHAMALLAS & WRIGGINS, supra note 14, at 89 (noting that

negligence law generally extends only to cases of physical injury).
32. See Anne Bloom, To Be Real: Sexual Identity Politics in Tort Litigation, 88 N.C. L. REV.

357, 410-13 (2010) (describing the heavy reliance on experts in tort litigation).
33. See Kathryn Abrams & Hila Keren, Law in the Cultivation of Hope, 95 CALIF. L. REV.

319 (2007) (arguing that law should cultivate hope in people who are despairing).
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II. WHAT ZEN CAN TEACH US ABOUT TORT LITIGATION
Zen Buddhists believe that to be alive is to suffer. 3 Because of
this, practices aimed at understanding and reducing suffering are
central to a Zen perspective." These practices, however, take a
somewhat different approach to suffering than conventional tort
theories.
Conventional tort theories acknowledge that the plaintiff has
experienced pain and suffering, but they focus primarily on "making
the plaintiff whole" through compensation. 36 Some of this
compensation covers the plaintiffs medical bills and lost income."
A separate amount is then meant to compensate the less-quantifiable
aspects of the plaintiffs pain and suffering.38 The focus in both
instances, however, is on using compensation to return the plaintiff
to a pre-injury position.39
Zen methods, in contrast, focus on the relationship between pain
and suffering. 40 Zen practices do not attempt to eliminate pain
(because that would be impossible); instead they seek to to reduce
suffering by helping practitioners accept pain rather than resist it. 41
From a Zen standpoint, a great deal of suffering is caused by our
attachment to a particular way of viewing the world in which we
view our identities as somehow separate from the realities around us,
including the pain we experience. 42 Zen practices teach that the way
to end suffering is to experience pain directly and accept it without

34. Or, more precisely, that "life as we usually live it is suffering." WATTS, supra note 27, at
46.
35. See id.
36. See John C. P. Goldberg, Two Conceptions of Tort Damages: Fair v. Full
Compensation, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 435, 435 (2006) (citing 4 FOWLER V. HARPER ET AL., THE
LAW OF TORTS § 25.1, at 490, 493 (2d ed. 1986)).
37. DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES 16 (Aspen Publishers 3d ed.
2002) (1985).
38. Id.

39. Id.; see also Goldberg, supra note 36, at 436 (describing tort damages as a "backwardlooking notion of restoration").
40. See WATTS, supra note 27, at 46-50; see also DARLENE COHEN, TURNING SUFFERING
INSIDE OUT: A ZEN APPROACH TO LIVING WITH PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL PAIN (2002)
(advocating a release of pain and suffering by paying closer attention to them).
41. See PEMA CHODRON, WHEN THINGS FALL APART: HEART ADVICE FOR DIFFICULT
TIMES 38 (2000).
42. See id. at 38-39.
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judgment.43 Put differently, Zen does not seek to make its
practitioners whole by eliminating pain and suffering; rather, it
attempts to reduce suffering by helping its practitioners view
themselves as whole, even when they are in pain.
At the same time, Zen teachings emphasize impermanence: the
constantly changing nature of all things, including suffering."
"Impermanence" means that we live in a dynamic and ever-changing
universe-there is no permanent self and no permanent condition
except change itself." Suffering arises when we become attached to
a particular way of looking at the world and attempt to resist
impermanence. 46 Suffering and our perceptions of it undergo
constant change. " It is therefore impossible to restore a person to a
pre-injury position, and Zen practices do not attempt to do so.
Many Zen teachings aim at helping Zen practitioners understand
suffering in this way." The goal of this Article is a much more
limited one. We need not adopt the Zen Buddhist approach to
suffering to see how Zen Buddhist beliefs shed light on some of the
more problematic aspects of contemporary tort litigation. Similarly,
we need not subscribe to Zen principles entirely to appreciate the
interesting possibilities that they suggest for reform.
The remainder of this part focuses on three specific tortlitigation practices: the emphasis on bodily harm,49 the heavy
reliance on experts, " and the rigid positioning of plaintiffs as
victims. ' These practices are problematic for many reasons. 52 Zen
43. See id. at 38-40, 45, 63, 122; see also WATTS, supra note 27, at 52-53 (explaining the

Buddhist concepts of "recollectedness" and contemplation).
44. See WATTS, supra note 27, at 42.

45. See id. at 42; see also CHODRON, supra note 41, at 10 ("Things are always in transition,
if we could only realize it.").
46. See WATTS, supra note 27, at 42-50; see also CHODRON, supra note 41, at 61

(encouraging the recognition of impermanence, suffering, and egolessness to find peace).
47. See CHODRON, supra note 41, at 10.

48.
49.
50.
51.

See SUZUKI, supra note 26, at 64-65.
CHAMALLAS & WRIGGINS, supra note 14, at 89-90.
See Bloom, supra note 32, at 410-13.
For a similar argument on the role of law in positioning parties as victims in a different

context, see Laura L. Rovner, PerpetuatingStigma: Client Identity in DisabilityRights Litigation,

2001 UTAH L. REv. 247, 302-04 (2001), which notes that calling people victims may lead them
to identify as victims.
52. Bloom, supra note 32, at 410-13 (critiquing the reliance on experts); see, e.g., Nancy
Levit, Ethereal Torts, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 136 (1992) (critiquing the emphasis on bodily
harm).
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Buddhist principles suggest, however, that the most serious problem
with these practices is that they interfere with our ability to fully
grasp the complexity of the plaintiffs condition. Zen principles also
expose something perhaps even more troubling: current approaches
may aggravate the original harm by unnecessarily positioning
plaintiffs as "victims.""
A. The Emphasis on Bodily Harm

Most tort claims require some sort of bodily injury for
recovery. 54 One of the most fundamental rules of tort law, for
example, is the economic loss rule, which precludes recovery for
purely economic harm in the absence of physical injury. " Similarly,
tort claims for emotional distress typically require that the plaintiff
demonstrate some form of physical impact or physical manifestation
of harm. 56 While these rules are often criticized, the body is still
considered the best indicator of the plaintiff s injuries. "
This emphasis on the body stems, in part, from concerns about
malingering (or fraud)." Even today, most legal commentators
believe that bodily harm is easier to verify than emotional harm."
This is so despite advances in technology that have made it possible
to distinguish between and physically verify many types of mental
injuries. 6o In one sense, these technological advances might lead to
greater emphasis on the body in tort law.' One could argue that if
53. For a similar argument in a different context, see Rovner, supra note 51, at 302-04. See
also Kathryn Abrams & Hila Keren, Who's Afraid of Law and the Emotions?, 94 MINN. L. REV.

1997, 2054-55 (2010) (describing how law tells us how to feel and how not to feel).

54. See, e.g., John C. P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Unrealized Torts, 88 VA. L.

REv. 1625, 1626 (2002) (noting how courts struggle with claims that do not involve bodily
harm); see also CHAMALLAS & WRIGGINS, supra note 14, at 89 (noting that negligence, the

preeminent theory in tort law, extends only to physical harm); Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note
54, at 1650 ("Traumatic bodily harm and illness are the paradigmatic forms of ultimate harm [in
tort law].").
55. See 2 DAN B. DOBBS, Economic andDignity Injury, in THE LAW OF TORTS 1115 (2001);

id at 632-33 (discussing torts that address legal harms apart from physical injury).

56. See id.
57. See CHAMALLAS & WRIGGINS, supra note 14, at 90. The one exception to this general
rule is the law regarding defamation. See DOBBS, supra note 55, at 1117.
58. CHAMALLAS & WRIGGINS, supra note 14, at 90.
59. See id.
60. Hubert Winston Smith, Relation of Emotions to Injury and Disease: Legal Liability for
Psychic Stimuli, 30 VA. L. REv. 193 (1944).
61.

See also W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS

§ 54,

at 360 (5th ed. 1984) ("Mental suffering is no more difficult to estimate in financial terms, and no
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mental injuries can be measured on the body, then there is no reason
not to use the body to gauge the extent of the plaintiff s injuries in all
types of tort cases. Indeed, some commentators have argued for a
relaxation of the physical impact rules along precisely these lines. 62
From a Zen standpoint, however, taking such an approach
ignores the relationship between the mind and the body with respect
to injury." Zen teaches that perceiving injury as harm is as much a
mental act as a physical one." This is easier to see when we switch
our focus from the body to understanding the plaintiffs experience
of suffering.
Zen practices encourage us to be attentive to when pain begins,
when it eases, when it gets worse, and how our perceptions of pain
and suffering change throughout this process. 65 Although the body
signals relative harm or wellness at any given moment, physical and
mental injuries are not static, and neither are our perceptions of them.
One day we are feeling well; the next day less so. In suffering, as
with anything else, there is continuous change.
How much we suffer as a result of these changes may be
influenced in part by what others tell us about our conditions and by
what we have otherwise come to expect. " In other words, how we

less a real injury than 'physical' pain."); id. at 361 ("Not only fright and shock, but other kinds of

mental injury are marked by definite physical symptoms, which are capable of medical or other
objective proof."); Peter A. Bell, The Bell Tolls: Toward Full Tort Recovery for Psychic Injury,

36 U. FLA. L. REV. 333 (1984) (describing continuing restrictions on tort liability for psychic
injury).
62. See, e.g., W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., supra note 61, at 360-61 (discussing how some

mental injuries have physical symptoms capable of medical proof); see also Bell, supra note 61,
at 335 (describing the "full recovery approach," which allows a plaintiff to recover for psychic
injury caused by the culpable conduct of a defendant under the same circumstances permitting
recovery for physical injury).
63. See SUZUKI, supra note 26; see also COHEN, supra note 40 (describing how the mind
can affect the body); Levit, supra note 52, at 184-85 (1992) (same).
64. See generally COHEN, supra note 40.
65. See CHODRON, supra note 41, at 62-63.
66. See, e.g., GILBERT, supra note 24, at 190-92 (describing how people perform in
response to suggestions about their expected capacity); see also id. at 229 (explaining how
theories about how people usually feel can influence memories of our own feelings); JOSEPH T.
HALLINAN, WHY WE MAKE MISTAKES: How WE LOOK WITHOUT SEEING, FORGET THINGS IN
SECONDS, AND ARE ALL PRETTY SURE WE ARE WAY ABOVE AVERAGE 113 (2009) (describing
how familiarity leads us to see things not as they are but as we expect them to be); Abrams &
Keren, supra note 53, at 2029 (arguing that law may influence, structure, and give meaning to
emotions).
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perceive pain depends, in part, on our point of reference. 67 This is not
an argument for ignoring physical indicators of injury and suffering,
nor is it a claim that physical injuries do not involve suffering. It is
simply a call to recognize that bodily indicators are not the only
source of information about the suffering a person has experienced."
There are perhaps no better examples of this than the cases of
individuals seeking to amputate healthy limbs. 6 From the standpoint
of the aspiring amputee, the presence of the healthy limb causes
significant suffering. Focusing on bodily harm as an indicator of
injury, however, obscures this reality. The only way to understand
the suffering caused by a healthy limb is to listen closely to the
individual's own account of her experiences. 70
Behavioral neurologist Vilayanur S. Ramachandran did just that
and discovered that people who seek to amputate healthy limbs are
not crazy (as was previously assumed); instead their perceptions are
the result of an unusual reorganization in the brain that affects how
would-be amputees perceive their bodies.n" By using low-tech
methods like mirrors, Ramachandran showed that perceptions of the
body can be reconstructed and changed. 72 These changed
perceptions, in turn, can lead to changes in the body that influence
future perceptions."
Zen Buddhism's lessons about how we perceive the body are
very similar. Zen teaches that our perceptions of injury and suffering
67. For a similar argument in the context of hedonic damages, see Samuel R. Bagenstos &
Margo Schlanger, Hedonic Damages, Hedonic Adaptation, and Disability, 60 VAND. L. REV.
745, 747 (2007). See also Susan Bandes, Empathy, Narrative & Victim Impact Statements, 63 U.
CHI. L. REV. 361, 375 (1996) (describing the role of personal experience in influencing
perspective). For examples of how people perceive injuries and disability differently, see
GILBERT, supra note 24, at 31-32, describing conjoined twins as "joyful, playful, and optimistic"
to the surprise of surgeons without this physical difference, and ROSEMARIE GARLAND
THOMSON, EXTRAORDINARY BODIES: FIGURING PHYSICAL DISABILITY IN AMERICAN CULTURE
AND LITERATURE (1997) for an argument that mainstream views about disability have more to do
with political marginalization of physical difference than medical conclusions.
68. See generally Bagenstos & Schlanger, supra note 67 (arguing a similar point in the
context of hedonic damages).
69. See generally John Colapinto, Brain Games: The Marco Polo of Neuroscience, NEW
YORKER, May 11, 2009, at 76 (telling the story of a doctor's meeting with a man who suffers
from a rare condition compelling him to have a perfectly healthy limb amputated).
70. Id. (describing a doctor's method which involves interviewing and a few hands-on tests).
7 1. Id.
72. Id. at 85, 82-83. In one experiment, for example, Ramachandran found that if a person in
pain views the painful area through a lens that makes it look smaller, she feels less pain. Id. at 86.
73. Id at 86.
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undergo constant change and, more fundamentally, that the mind and
body are closely linked. Because of this, focusing on the body alone
can only tell us part of the story.7 4 While physical indicators may
suggest more or less suffering at any particular moment, the
plaintiffs changing perceptions of her injuries may be equally, if not
more, important." The conventional emphasis on bodily harm in
contemporary tort litigation, however, prevents us from fully
understanding this aspect of the plaintiff s injuries and suffering.
B. The Heavy Reliance on Experts

Zen principles suggest that the conventional emphasis on expert
testimony in tort litigation is problematic for similar reasons."
Contemporary tort litigation places a great deal of emphasis on
expert testimony because experts supposedly offer more "objective"
testimony about the nature and causes of a plaintiff s injuries. From a
Zen standpoint, however, this notion of expert "objectivity" is based
on the mistaken belief that the expert and her observations are
somehow separate. But, of course, they are not.
Even experts are influenced by a so-called normality bias that
makes it easier for them to see something that they expect to see
rather than something they do not. " This has particular relevance for
tort law because the normality bias makes it more difficult for
anyone to understand a plaintiff s injury from anything other than the
perspective of our own expectations. " As the normality bias
demonstrates, our understanding of others is deeply colored by our
own experiences. 79 Because experts are also affected by this bias, it

74. See SUZUKI, supra note 26; see also COHEN, supra note 40, at 5 (alleviating pain and

suffering requires that we familiarize ourselves with "the thoughts and feelings that define our
suffering," and acknowledge how we perceive this suffering in our everyday lives).
75. See generally Bagenstos & Schlanger, supra note 67, at 747 (arguing that adoptive
preferences should not be automatically rejected as a measure of justice or as a basis for policy).
76. See Bloom, supra note 32, at 410 (describing the heavy reliance on experts in tort
litigation).
77. CHAMALLAS & WRIGGINS, supra note 14, at 127.

78. For example, as Chamallas and Wriggins observe, "the normality bias predisposes us to
sympathize more with those who typically suffer less and inures us to the pain of hardships we
expect." Id (internal quotation marks omitted).
79. See id.
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is a mistake to believe that their opinions are "objective." In fact,
they are not. "

The emphasis on expert testimony in tort litigation is also
problematic because it tends to obscure the fact that tort litigation
necessarily involves a great deal of uncertainty." Although experts
routinely offer opinions in tort litigation that sound conclusive, there
are usually significant questions about both the nature and the cause
of the plaintiffs injuries. 8 2 Many contemporary theories of legal
analysis in tort law attempt to reduce this uncertainty.83 And, in the
typical case, experts play a leading role in these efforts.
Cases like Riss, however, expose the limitations of our
methods. " We can put on expert witnesses to testify to the
magnitude of a victim's physical and emotional injuries, and, if the
experts are good enough, they can even provide a rough
quantification of the harms inflicted. But, no formula permits us to
reliably predict how future events will change the injuries or, more
importantly, how the victims will experience the injuries."
Experts also cannot fully eliminate the uncertainty surrounding
causation. In theory, this should not a problem because the legal test
for causation incorporates a fair amount of uncertainty in its "more
likely than not" standard." In practice, however, uncertainty about
80. Id at 123. Indeed, from a Zen perspective, expert opinion may be more problematic than
the views of non-experts. See McHugh, supra note 29, at 1300 (noting that Zen teachers value the
so-called "beginner's mind" that is "open" and "uncluttered with preconceived notions.").
81. Levit, supra note 52, at 137-38 (providing an overview of the problem).
82. See DOBBS, supra note 55, at 446. The remedies phase introduces more uncertainty. See
LAYCOCK, supra note 37, at 16 (discussing the difficulties with restoring a plaintiff to the
"rightful position").
83. See Jason S. Johnston, Bayesian Fact-Findingand Efficiency: Toward an Economic
Theory of Liability Under Uncertainty, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 137, 139 (1987) (giving examples of
attempts to reduce uncertainty in tort law); Levit, supra note 52, at 137-38; see also ARIEL
PORAT & ALEX STEIN, TORT LIABILITY UNDER UNCERTAINTY (2001), at 185-206 (providing

solutions for liability with uncertainty).
84. Bloom, supra note 32, at 410; see also Michael D. Green, Expert Witnesses and
Sufficiency of Evidence in Toxic Substances Litigation: The Legacy of Agent Orange and
Bendectin Litigation, 86 Nw. U. L. REV. 643, 643-44 ("[U]ncertainty is the breeding ground of

controversy and factual disputes. Where uncertainty exists ... adversaries inevitably employ
expert witnesses.").
85. See Riss v. City of New York, 240 N.E.2d 860 (N.Y. 1968).
86. See Levit, supra note 52, at 137-38.
87. See DOBBS, supra note 55, at 464; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:
LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM ch. 6 (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005) (making an actor liable
for the harms caused by tortious conduct and limiting liability concurrently).
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causation is a problem and parties and courts routinely employ
experts in an attempt to eliminate the uncertainty. 5 But no amount of
expert testimony can change the fact that uncertainty is inherent to
causal analysis.8 9
As the legal standard for causation acknowledges, causation is
more a matter of probability than certainty.90 Where experts may be
helpful is in the employment of probability theory to estimate the
odds of causation." Because probability theory involves complex
scientific information and mathematical calculations, many assume
that jurors will reach more accurate verdicts if they hear the experts'
conclusions rather than attempting to draw conclusions on their
own.92 But this assumption is inaccurate; experts have as much
difficulty as jurors in determining causation.
In part, this is because scientific analysis simply does not lend
itself to the types of causal analyses that tort litigation typically
demands.9 3 In a lawsuit, the causation question must be decided
definitively. At the end of the day, a jury reaches a final conclusion
about whether the defendant's actions were or were not the cause of
the plaintiffs injuries. In science, however, the quest for
understanding is ongoing.94
In other words, scientific analysis of causation incorporates the
Zen tenet of constant change; legal analysis does not. Despite the
differences in analytical approach, however, tort litigation asks
scientific experts to testify about causation in ways that suggest that
questions about injuries and causation can be frozen in time and
answered with certainty.
88. Green, supra note 84, at 643, 644-45. This is in marked contrast to the practices of
earlier times when the causation determination typically went to a jury without the benefit of
expert opinion. See generally Levit, supra note 52, at 137-38 (discussing the history and modern
state of causation).
89. See Green, supra note 84, at 643, 644-45.
90. Id.
91. Levit, supra note 52, at 136-38.
92. Id.
93. CHAMALLAS & WRIGGINS, supra note 14, at 122-23. As a result of this, one of the key
pieces of information that a lawyer conveys to an expert asked to provide an opinion is the
applicable legal standard of "more likely than not." Without a proper understanding of the
appropriate legal standard, inexperienced experts may inadvertently make statements that harm a
party's case.
94. As noted by Chamallas and Wriggins, "the nature of medical and scientific proof is ...
continually evolving, while legal proof calls for a more timely and final resolution." CHAMALLAS
& WRIGGINS, supra note 14, at 123.
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A good example of this is the litigation involving the "lost
chance" doctrine, a theory of causation used in a limited number of
tort cases. 9 In the classic case, the plaintiff alleges that a doctor's
negligence caused her to miss out on a chance of recovery. Although
the theory has a potentially broad application, most courts apply it
only to medical malpractice cases involving misdiagnosis 96 and
many courts do not apply the lost chance doctrine at all. 9
Much of the reluctance to adopting the doctrine stems from
criticism that emphasizes the uncertainty surrounding what the
plaintiff has lost.9 In lost chance cases, however, there is no doubt
that there is a loss.99 Concern about how to prove the certainty of the
loss, however, prevents courts from using the lost chance doctrine to
provide meaningful relief. '

But, of course, from a scientific (and Zen) perspective, this kind
of uncertainty always exists. o' All an expert can ever do is estimate
probability and even the best estimates will change over time. The
challenge for tort law is to accept this reality and allow parties to
litigate claims in light of it.
In sum, conclusions about injury and causation are fraught with
bias even when they are made by experts. 102 Instead of removing this
95. David A. Fischer, Tort Recovery for Loss of a Chance, 36
(2001).

WAKE FOREST L.

REV. 605

96. Id.

97. See id. at 610 (suggesting only a increasing minority of courts accept the lost chance
doctrine).
98. See, e.g., Jones v. Owings, 456 S.E.2d 371, 374 (S.C. 1995) ("We are persuaded that 'the
loss of chance doctrine is fundamentally at odds with the requisite degree of medical certitude
necessary to establish a causal link between the injury of a patient and the tortious conduct of a
physician."' (quoting Kilpatrick v. Bryant, 868 S.W.2d 594, 602 (Tenn. 1993))); see also Lars
Noah, An Inventory of Mathematical Blunders in Applying the Loss-of-a-Chance Doctrine, 24

LITIG. 369, 370 (2005) (emphasizing the difficulty of the mathematical calculations
involved).
REv.

99. See Joseph H. King, Jr., Causation, Valuation, and Chance in Personal Injury Torts
Involving Preexisting Conditions and Future Consequences, 90 YALE L.J. 1353, 1356 (1981).
100. See, e.g., Bryson B. Moore, The Law of Torts: South CarolinaRejects the Lost Chance

Doctrine, 48 S.C. L. REV. 201, 214 (1996) ("A major problem with extending the doctrine to
other fields is the greater difficulty in ascertaining the percentage chance lost.").
101. See Levit, supra note 52, at 136; see also Doll v. Brown, 75 F.3d 1200, 1207 (7th Cir.
1996) ("Yet no less uncertainty attends the efforts of triers of fact to fix the percentage of a
plaintiff's negligence in a tort case governed, as most tort cases are today, by the rule of

comparative negligence."); Paul M. Secunda, A Public Interest Model for Applying Lost Chance
Theory to ProbabilisticInjuries in Employment DiscriminationCases, 2005 WiS. L. REV. 747,

760 n.73 (2005).
102. See CHAMALLAS & WRIGGINS, supra note 14, at 123.
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bias, the heavy reliance on experts in tort litigation makes an
inherently subjective situation seem more objective than it really is.
At the same time, the emphasis on expert opinion minimizes the
significance of other potentially important sources of information,
such as lay-witness testimony and juror experience. '3
Considering a broader array of perspectives cannot eliminate, or
even reduce, the uncertainty surrounding causation and other issues
in tort litigation. But placing more emphasis on non-expert
perspectives may allow us to develop a better understanding of the
plaintiffs suffering and the role that uncertainty plays in that
experience. Experts offer the promise of greater objectivity and
certainty but cannot fully deliver either. We have no such
expectations about lay testimony and juror deliberations. And, for
that very reason, they may be more helpful.
C. PositioningPlaintiffs as Victims

Taking Zen principles seriously also reveals another limitation
of contemporary tort-litigation practices: the tendency to position
plaintiffs as victims. 104 Zen practices emphasize the impermanence
of all things, including suffering. The adversarial posture of tort
litigation, however, tends to push plaintiffs into identifying
categorically as victims whose sufferings are largely static.
While this positioning is understandable from a strategic
perspective, the litigation proceeds as if this limited identity captures
the entirety of the plaintiffs past and future experiences with her
injuries. But plaintiffs have many other aspects of their identities
beyond their role as "victims" in tort litigation. And, perhaps more
important, all aspects of their identities are undergoing constant
change. Because tort litigation offers little opportunity for plaintiffs
to express this complexity, however, we get a distorted picture of
what is going on.

103. Id. The Third Restatement emphasizes the difference between scientific causation and
legal causation and attempts to recalibrate the balance back toward the jury. This shift seems
unlikely, however, given tort law's heavy reliance on expert testimony. See Bloom, supra note
32, at 410 (describing the role of experts in tort litigation).
104. See, e.g., Bagenstos & Schlanger, supra note 67, at 755-56 (describing how lawyers and
judges encourage a view of injuries as completely disabling); see also Rovner, supra note 5 1, at
250 (stating that plaintiffs' lawyers portray their disabled clients as "broken, weak, unable to
function, and deserving of pity").
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Unfortunately, the implications of this extend far beyond the
litigation. Judges, lawyers, and other legal actors play important roles
in shaping how plaintiffs perceive their injuries and, ultimately, their
identities. 1o' When experts and lawyers repeatedly present a plaintiff
as a "victim," with permanent injuries for which there is no
possibility of change, they help the plaintiff to construct a particular
experience or perception of suffering that may be more permanent
and all-consuming than it would be otherwise. 106
These comments are not intended to minimize the trauma of
serious injury. The point is simply that the experience of injury is not
static. For tort litigation to pretend otherwise creates problems for
everyone, including the plaintiffs. Under the current approach,
plaintiffs are forced to identify over and over again as victims, rather
than as individuals with more complex (and constantly changing)
identities. This is stifling for the plaintiffs and does little to advance a
more complex understanding of the injuries and suffering involved.
III. A ZEN-INFLUENCED ALTERNATIVE

What Zen-influenced practices might we adopt in tort litigation
to help us better understand the nature of the plaintiffs suffering?
Zen Buddhism encourages practices that begin with a commitment to
deep engagement with the plaintiffs suffering. Zen also offers two
key insights about suffering that are helpful: the importance of direct
experience and the inevitability of change. "'
Part II argued that taking these insights seriously exposes three
particularly problematic aspects of contemporary tort litigation: a
misleading emphasis on bodily harm, an over-reliance on expert
testimony, and the rigid positioning of plaintiffs as victims. All three
105. See Rovner, supra note 51, at 312-13; see also Bloom, supra note 32, at 365 (suggesting
legal rulings shape perception of political and cultural reality); Austin Sarat & William L. F.
Felstiner, Law and Strategy in the Divorce Lawyer's Office, 20 LAW & SOc'Y REV. 93, 126
(1986) ("Lawyers serve the legal system by helping clients 'redefine ... [their] situation and
restructure ... [their] perceptions' . . . .").
106. See Ellen S. Pryor, Noneconomic Damages, Suffering, and the Role of the Plaintif's
Lawyer, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 563, 565 (2006) (arguing that plaintiffs lawyers influence their
client's experience of suffering); see also EDWARD B. BLANCHARD & EDWARD J. HICKLING,
AFTER THE CRASH: ASSESSMENT AND TREATMENT OF MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENT SURVIVORS
171-86 (1997) (summarizing research on whether tort litigation prolongs or exacerbates
suffering); Bagenstos & Schlanger, supranote 67, at 785 ("[B]y focusing on the negative feelings
that occur during [the period of injury], plaintiffs with disabilities may delay or derail their
ultimate ability to adapt to their new condition .....
107. See supra Parts I, II.B.
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of these practices obscure important aspects of the plaintiffs
condition and, as a result, they prevent us from using tort litigation
effectively as a tool to reduce suffering. At the same time, the
critique of these practices also provides us with a rough outline of
affirmative steps we could take in the direction of a Zen-influenced
alternative.
The analysis in Part II suggests, for example, that a Zeninfluenced approach to tort litigation would adopt a more complex
view on the significance of the body in understanding plaintiffs'
injuries. When we engage deeply with a plaintiffs suffering, we
learn that the body is not always a reliable indicator of the nature and
the extent of the plaintiffs suffering. We also learn that the
plaintiffs perceptions of suffering and bodily integrity may undergo
change. ' For both reasons, a Zen-influenced approach to tort
litigation would acknowledge that the mind and body are linked.
The critique offered in Part II also calls for a more complex
perspective on the utility of expert testimony. Experts should be freer
to acknowledge the complexity of causation but, more
fundamentally, expert testimony should not occupy such a privileged
place in tort litigation. Instead, greater attention should be paid to
testimony from those with direct experience with the injuries.
Finally, Part II encourages us to allow plaintiffs to have more
complex and fluid identities in which they are not always required to
perform as "victims." A Zen-influenced approach to tort litigation
would encourage legal actors to adopt more open and flexible
characterizations of the plaintiffs injuries. Zen principles also
suggest that there ought to be more room in tort litigation for
acknowledging that suffering is a common experience. Defense
lawyers often try to make this point to minimize the plaintiffs
injuries, but the Zen point is a broader one. If we view suffering as a
common experience, then our relationship to suffering tends to be
different. We begin to see suffering as part of what makes us human
and as something to be understood and processed when it happens
rather than as something that should be eradicated as quickly as
possible.

108. See Bagenstos & Schlanger, supra note 67, at 746 (noting that people adjust to their
possibilities).
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This is not an argument in favor of suffering. Nor is it a claim
that all suffering is the same. On the contrary, the suffering of a tort
plaintiff is likely quite different than the suffering that is encountered
as part of ordinary life experience. 109 Rather, it is a suggestion that
we should pay more attention in tort litigation to understanding the
complex, diverse, and sometimes unexpected ways we experience
suffering.
One way to make progress on all of these fronts is to make more
room for testimony of direct experience. Contemporary litigation
practices increasingly marginalize the plaintiffs voice in favor of
expert testimony. Indeed, many trials are bifurcated and focus first
on causation, which tends to privilege expert testimony over the
plaintiffs own recounting of her experience. 1o This silencing of the
plaintiff may make sense from a short-term-efficiency standpoint,
but it does little to advance the plaintiffs healing or our own
understanding of the suffering involved.
Most plaintiffs long for an opportunity to tell the story of their
suffering and, in many instances, having this opportunity is more
important than obtaining compensation or preventing future harm to
others. ' Moreover, there is a wealth of evidence that telling one's
story can be healing and is often transformative for the people
involved. 112 We ought to make more space for these transformations
in tort litigation.
We might also seek other sources of direct experiential
testimony, such as third-party testimony from individuals who have

109. See Lee Taft, On Bended Knee (With Fingers Crossed), 55 DEPAUL L. REv. 601, 612
(2006) ("The parent who loses his or her child because another fails to obey a traffic signal
suffers differently from the parent whose child dies from illness. Both grieve, but the grief of the

tort claimant is compounded with powerful and complex emotions because of the relationship of
their loss to another's wrongful act.").
I 10. See generally Elizabeth G. Thornburg, The ManagerialJudge Goes to Trial,44 U. RICH.

L. REv. 1261, 1272, 1302 (2010) (noting that causation is often phase one of a trial and
commenting on the empirical studies that show bifurcation influences outcomes).
11l. See, e.g., Kathryn Abrams, Hearing the Call of Stories, 79 CALIF. L. REV. 971 (1991);
see also Henderson,supra note 19, at 1649; Tom R. Tyler, What is ProceduralJustice?:Criteria
Used by Citizens to Assess the Fairnessof Legal Procedures, 22 LAw & SOC'Y REv. 103, 105
(1988) (noting that involvement in the decision-making process enhances the participants'
perception of fairness).
112. For more on the value of experiential narratives, see Abrams, supranote 111, at 973-75,
for an examination of feminist narrative scholarship as a distinctive form of legal argument and
Richard Delgado, Storytellingfor Oppositionists and Others: A Pleafor Narrative,87 MICH. L.
REv. 2411, 2412 (1989), for an examination the use of stories in the struggle for racial reform.
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undergone similar experiences but do not otherwise have the
educational or professional background to provide expert testimony
under traditional rules. Obtaining testimony from these "experiential
experts" would be valuable to defendants, who may not be fully
aware of how their conduct affected the plaintiff and who may be
better able to hear the information when it comes from a third party.
Third-party testimony would also provide a further check against
faking because the plaintiffs testimony would be heard in a broader
context that includes testimony from others with similar injuries.
Making space for this type of testimony would also be valuable
to plaintiffs. Tort litigation currently does little to encourage
plaintiffs to connect with people who have the same or similar
injuries. This is a mistake. Psychological studies confirm the value of
hearing from others who have undergone similar experiences. "
Among other things, this testimony is the best source of information
about the likely future of those involved in the current lawsuit. "
Experts also have a role in this process, of course, but experiential
testimony should also be valued.
Third-party experiential testimony would also bring broad social
benefits. By gaining a better understanding of how an injury is
experienced, we might learn how to address and prevent such
injuries in the future. Zen reminds us that questions about injury and
causation are not scientific inquiries but social inquiries. "' Once we
acknowledge this, it seems clear that we should allocate more space
for discussions that allow us to understand the nature of the injuries
in a broader context.
In short, can we make space for exploring not only the plaintiffs
experience of suffering but also the experiences of others? Can we
also make space for understanding how the experience of this
suffering can undergo change? And, finally, can we make space for a
broader discussion about how the suffering in any given case relates
to suffering in a broader context? These would seem to be some of
the key qualities of a Zen alternative.

113. GILBERT, supra note 24, at 251 (and citations therein).
114. Id.

115. In fact, many commentators acknowledge just that. See generally PORAT & STEIN, supra
note 83, at 16-17 (discussing the social necessity of relying on imperfect facts).
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IV. CONCLUSION
Tort litigation takes place in a field of pain and death. "6
Contemporary theories of legal analysis encourage lawyers, judges,
and experts to act as analytical voyeurs in this field. The injuries are
recognized; indeed, they are necessary. "' But the pain and death are
kept at a distance.
This Article has argued for erasing this distance and, more
broadly, for adopting practices that encourage greater personal
engagement with the plaintiffs suffering. It has done so by relying
on several insights from Zen Buddhism. Zen encourages recognition
of suffering through observation and direct experience, and through
acceptance of suffering's impermanent nature. Tort litigation would
do well to adopt this approach as its own. To do so, however,
requires adopting practices that allow for deeper engagement with
the human experience of suffering and accepting the uncertainty that
accompanies the constancy of change.
This Article has argued for practices that move us away from
bodily harm as the starting place for understanding suffering and
toward viewing the body and mind as linked. It has also cautioned
against overreliance on experts, who have limited direct experience
with the injuries involved in a particular lawsuit. Instead, it has
encouraged us to listen more closely to the voices of plaintiffs and to
seek out testimony from others who are similarly situated.
Although we live in a world of uncertainty, we know that our
best capacity to predict the future comes from listening to those who
have already been there. "' When it came to Linda Riss's injuries,
some of my students had been there and they wished that they could
have shared their experiences with Riss. Can we make space for
voices like those of my students, especially where it is clear that their
perspective is likely to prove beneficial? And might such space also
allow plaintiffs room to redefine themselves within the litigation? "'
116.

The language is Rovert Cover's. Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J.

1601, 1601 (1986) ("[Llegal interpretation takes place in a field of pain and death."). Cover used
this phrase to emphasize the role of judges and other legal actors in authorizing violence. Id But
tort litigation reminds us that pain and death are part of what the litigants themselves bring to the
table.
117. See sources cited supra note 54 (noting the role of injury to obtain standing in tort cases).
118. GILBERT, supra note 24, at 114-16 (and citations therein).
119. See Lucie E. White, Subordination,Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoes: Notes
on the Hearing of Mrs. G., 38 BUFF. L. REv. 1 (1990); see also Stuart Scheingold & Anne
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To attempt to do so may be, as the Zen proverb goes, an exercise
in "[k]nock[ing] on the sky and listen[ing] to the sound." In tort
litigation, we need to acknowledge that we are, in a sense, knocking
on the sky when we attempt to understand another person's
experience of suffering. It is truly that difficult to understand another
person's pain. But, just as importantly, we must listen to what our
knocking produces. If we knock on the doors of experts and demand
evidence in the form of bodily harm, we will hear accounts of
suffering that are shaped by this knocking. 120 Alternatively, if we
knock on the door of suffering with a more open posture, we may
hear much more. 121 It is this listening, and the hope that listening
provides to those who are injured, that is perhaps tort litigation's
highest role.

Bloom, TransgressiveCause Lawyering: PracticeSites and the Politicizationof the Professional,
5 INT'L J. LEGAL PROF. 209, 238 (1998) (reporting on lawyers who made special efforts to ensure
that litigation would empower their clients).
120. See Martha Minow, The Supreme Court, 1986 Term, Foreword: Justice Engendered,
101 HARV. L. REv. 10, 26-30 (1987) (making similar points in the gender context); see also
Abrams & Keren, supra note 53, at 2044-45 ("[T]he emotions that pervade law are often
'invisible' and therefore an independent effort is often necessary to expose the emotions that are
relevant to the discussion."); Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A
Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L.
REv. 1161, 1208 (1995) (explaining that once something is categorized, we are more likely to see
the attributes of the category).
121. See Minow, supra note 120, at 72 (arguing for identification with "the other").

